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Abstract: The aim of this overview article is to examine and assess monetary issues crucial 
for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) entry strategy. The optimum currency area 
(OCA) criteria are not used in assessing Polish suitability for the EMU, as they were not de-
cisive in the process of the EMU creation. The degree of the Maastricht criteria fulfilment by 
the existing members on the examination date, i.e. on 1 January 1997 is analysed. Further, 
the official European Central Bank (ECB) and Commission position regarding the enlarge-
ment of the monetary union is presented. Next, we attempt to present the rationale behind 
the early EMU strategy in the case of Poland. We also use data on Slovenia to demonstrate 
and compare different roads and attitudes to the EMU. The state of convergence of monetary 
and economic variables are presented and assessed. To address the issue of convergence, the 
ability to sustainably meet the Maastricht criteria are also considered. 
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union, EMU entrance strategy, nominal convergence, 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, Poland.
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1. The Maastricht criteria
In order to promote convergence between the EU countries on their way towards 
the EMU, monetary and fiscal criteria were stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht 
in 1991. These provisions are not a simple reflection of the OCA criteria. Indeed 
the Maastricht criteria are not easily justifiable along the theory lines, De Grauwe 
(2000). Thus they reflect some arbitrariness of political decisions that led to the es-
tablishment of the monetary union. The Maastricht criteria are both the outcome 
1 The authors are grateful to Anna Matysek-Jedrych for splendid research assistance. 
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of accrued experience and of a long political bargaining process that started as early 
as in 1987 and was concluded during the intergovernmental conference that pre-
ceded the Maastricht Summit, (e.g. see Dyson and Featherstone (1999), Arestis et 
al (1999) and Skrobisz (2005)). 
For the sake of analytical clarity it is useful to consider separately the criteria re-
lated to the monetary framework and the criteria concerning the fiscal framework. 
The former will be discussed in detail in this article. The latter will be addressed in 
a forthcoming article. The Maastricht criteria are as follows:
1.1. Monetary criteria
1.1.1. Price stability
“The achievement of a high degree of price stability [...] will be apparent from a rate of 
inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in 
terms of price stability”, TEC Article 121(1). In practice the inflation rate must not 
exceed by more than 150 basic points (bp) the average of the three best perform-
ing European Union countries in the year preceding the examination (Protocol 24 
to the TEC).
1.1.2. Interest rate
“The durability of convergence achieved by the Member State and of its participation 
in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (ESM), being re-
flected in the long-term interest rate levels”, TEC Article 121(1). This translates into 
the condition that the nominal long-term interest rate in the year prior to the ex-
amination must not exceed by more than 200 bp that of the three best-performing 
Member States in terms of price stability (Protocol 24 of the TEC).
1.1.3. Exchange rate
“The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided by the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devalu-
ing against the currency of any other Member State”,  TEC Article 121(1). In prac-
tice the participation in the EMS must be continuous and there must be no severe 
tensions during two years before the examination. The EMS was replaced by the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) on 1 January 1999. 
Besides, the Treaty stipulates the need for independent monetary authorities in 
place (Article 108 of the TEC). The independence of national central banks has to be 
anchored in the national legal framework (Article 109 of the TEC). The European 
Commission (EC) and the ECB assume the monitoring responsibilities of the 
Maastricht criteria fulfilment and report regularly to the Economic and Financial 
Council (ECOFIN) which is a decision making body. Any applicant country is 
subject to an assessment of the criteria fulfilment (Article 122 of the TEC). This as-
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sessment is done jointly by the EC and the ECB. Based on the outcome of the as-
sessment the ECOFIN takes the decision whether an applicant country meets the 
provisions of the Treaty.
1.2. Fiscal criteria
The treaty stipulates: ”The sustainability of the government financial position [...] will 
be apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position without a defi-
cit that is excessive [...]”. In practice the compliance to the budgetary discipline is 
judged according to the two following criteria:
1.2.1. Government debt
The ratio of the government debt to the GDP must not exceed 60% in the year pri-
or to the examination. However, if it is not the case, the ratio must be satisfactorily 
diminished and must be approaching the 60% level at a reasonable pace (Protocol 
24 of the TEC).
1.2.2. Annual government deficit
The ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) must 
not exceed 3% at the end of the year preceding the examination. If this is not the 
case, the ratio must have declined substantially to a level close to 3% or, alternatively, 
must remain close to 3% and any exceptional excess must be temporary (Protocol 
24 of the TEC).
2. The Maastricht criteria – some political considerations 
The Maastricht criteria came under criticism right after their draft (e.g. see Pasinetti 
1998). The weak point is the arbitrariness of their level. Indeed, there is no economic 
reason why the debt and the deficit level should not exceed respectively 60% and 
3% of the GDP2. Simultaneously, as a result of pressures from Germany concerned 
about the long term sustainability of the Maastricht fiscal framework the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) was added in 1997 in order to improve the fiscal discipline 
inside the EMU. Indeed the EMU member countries without the SGP rules would 
have little incentive to abide by the provisions of the Maastricht treaty after the 
successful examination and the official introduction of the common currency. The 
2 In the long run a deficit of 3% and debt level of 60% is reconcilable with nominal growth rate of 5% 
i.e. the average growth rate of Germany in the 1980’. Some authors believe the Maastricht criteria were 
tailored to be consistent with the historical economic performance of Germany, see Laufer (1997).
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successful entrants in the absence of the SGP could pursue excessively loose fiscal 
policies and thus exploit the credibility of the common currency area as a whole. 
In consequence, the credibility would be impaired and there would be a danger of 
inflation. Simultaneously, the responsible country would be affected over-propor-
tionally since the ‘costs’ of its policy are pooled among all the EMU members. To 
prevent this ‘free riding’ phenomenon all the member countries had to commit to 
maintaining  the budgetary discipline. Formally the SGP consists of three elements, 
European Commission (EC) 2004):
a political commitment by all parties involved in the SGP to the full and timely  –
implementation of the surveillance process,
a regular monitoring of budget deficits done on a basis of stability and conver- –
gence programmes,
a requirement of corrective actions and, if necessary, imposition of sanctions ac- –
cording to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). 
Despite the allure of robustness and impartiality, the influence of the SGP on 
short-term fiscal policies in practice is decisively mitigated by political considera-
tions. The Commission has been merely given a monitoring and initiatory role if a 
member country does not comply with the Maastricht provisions (EC 2004). The 
sanctions enforcement decisions are taken by the Council. In consequence the mem-
bers of the Council are effectively judges in their own case. They have had little in-
centive to enforce sanctions since they are potential violators of the budget deficit 
rule some time in the future. The arbitrariness of the Maastricht criteria makes it 
easy to justify a breach of the budget deficit rule in the time of adverse economic 
developments. For these reasons the dissuasive power of the Pact is weaker than ini-
tially planned as could be seen from the  ECOFIN rulings on German and French 
deficits.  In March 2005 ECOFIN and finally the European Council decided to sof-
ten the SGP, Council Regulation (1055/2005). Although the two thresholds (name-
ly 3% deficit and 60% public debt) have been unchanged the EDP procedure has 
been to a certain degree relaxed (e.g. no EDP should be launched against a member 
state with a negative or prolonged period of low growth). Moreover the modified 
SGP lists relevant factors letting a country off an EDP. This decision was welcomed 
by the French and German governments but was criticized by the ECB (2005a and 
2005b) and the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
2.1. The Maastricht criteria fulfilment in the past
The inspection of the Maastricht criteria fulfilment on the examination date i.e. 
on 1 January 1997 (Table 1) offers a good illustration of the role played by political 
considerations in the establishment of the European Monetary Union. As can be 
seen from Table 1 not all the countries met the Maastricht criteria on the exami-
nation date.
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Table 1. The degree of Maastricht criteria convergence on the examination date




deficit (as % 
of the GDP)*
Public debt 
(as % of the 
GDP)
Austria 1.1 5.7 Yes –1.9 63.9
Belgium 1.4 5.8 Yes 2.0 123.0
Denmark 1.6 6.3 Yes 0.5 61.3
Finland 1.3 6.0 Yes –1.5 54.1
France 1.2 5.6 Yes –3.0 59.0
Germany 1.4 5.6 Yes 2.6 60.9
Greece 5.2 9.9 Yes –4.6 108.5
Ireland 1.2 6.3 Yes 0.8 65.3
Italy 1.8 6.9 Yes –2.7 119.8
Luxembourg 1.4 5.6 Yes 3.6 6.0
Netherlands 1.8 5.6 Yes –1.2 70.3
Portugal 1.8 6.4 Yes –2.6 60.3
Spain 1.8 6.4 Yes –3.2 66.7
Sweden 1.9 6.6 No –2.0 75.0
UK 1.8 7.1 No –2.0 50.8
reference value on 
examination date  
(1 January 1997)
2.7 8.0 ERM –3.0 60.0
*  A minus sign indicates a deficit.
S o u r c e :  European Commission (1998).
The Commission and the Council have used the built-in flexibility in the crite-
ria formulation to qualify almost all the applicants for the third stage of the EMU 
(Greece was the only applicant that did not qualify). Both Belgium and Italy were 
positively judged on their debt reducing performance and could join at early date, 
whereas Spain was admitted despite having exceeded the budget deficit and public 
debt threshold (comp. Table 1). Simultaneously, what cannot be seen from Table 1, 
Finland and Italy were qualified for the third stage without the full two-year member-
ship in ERM, staying respectively for 15 and 14 months (Council Decision 98/317/
EC of 3 May 1998). The UK and Denmark requested and actually got an opt-out 
clause. Sweden decided to postpone the EMU membership. Later on it was agreed 
that any subsequent entrant will be assessed according to the Maastricht criteria 
fulfilment, following the principle of equal treatment (ECB 2003). 
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2.2. Exchange rate policy towards non EMU members
The principles of cooperation between the EMU members and other EU members 
were agreed by the ECOFIN in 1996. There have been some institutional changes 
at the beginning of the third stage, for the entry strategy the most important being 
the replacing of the ‘old’ ERM by a new exchange rate system (ERM II) on 1 January 
1999. ERM II is an exchange rate agreement based on central rates agreed mutu-
ally by all the parties: a new entrant, the EMU countries, the ECB and other ERM 
II member countries (ECB 2003). 
ERM II has two roles (ECB 2003): firstly, by introducing the element of rigidity 
it fosters convergence between the EMU and a participating country, secondly, it 
allows for testing the equilibrium level of the exchange rate. The fluctuation corri-
dor is set to +/– 15% with automatic bilateral interventions upon reaching the mar-
gin of the band, provided the intervention does not conflict with the price stability 
objective of the European Central Bank. Simultaneously, a narrower band can be 
individually agreed (ECB 2003). In principle, the timing of entry into ERM II is a 
decision of the participating country (see the case of Sweden), however all the EU 
members (except for the UK and Denmark) are expected to join at some future date. 
What is interesting, according to the readings of the Treaty a country can be quali-
fied to the third stage of the EMU against its own will (Nowak-Far 2001). Indeed 
the Article 122 (2) of the TEC stipulates that the ECOFIN shall decide by a quali-
fied majority on a proposal from the Commission which members with a deroga-
tion meet the necessary conditions and ‘abrogate the derogations of the Member 
States concerned’. However, this is only a theoretical possibility and it will not be 
further considered. 
According to the Treaty, all the EU members are required to treat their exchange 
rate policy as a matter of common interest and to pursue price stability as a pri-
mary objective of their monetary policy. It is noteworthy that the price stability is 
strongly anchored in the Act on the National Bank of Poland (NBP), that will be 
further discussed in section 6.2. Unilateral euroization (including a currency board 
system) has been excluded by the European Commission and the ECB as incom-
patible with the logic and spirit of the European monetary integration, Begg et al. 
(2002), Solbes (2003). This is criticised as a sign of immaturity of the Euro to serve 
as a global currency, Bratkowski and Rostowski (2002).
Summing up, the exchange rate criterion has been treated with some degree of 
flexibility in the past. The full two-year membership was not deemed necessary in 
the case of Italy and Finland. The implications of the assessment procedure based 
on the principle of equal treatment and difficulties related to the membership in 
ERM II will be analysed in section 7. 
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3. Early entry strategy – what was the earliest possible date?
Poland and the other new EU members are treated as EMU member states ‘with a 
derogation’ (Art. 122 of the TEC). The principle of equal treatment applies, so an 
applicant country has to undergo a minimum two-year long accession process (Art. 
109 of the TEC). It has been stressed by the Commission and the ECB officials that 
ERM II should not be considered as a mere waiting room before the full member-
ship, see e.g. Weltke (2002), Trichet (2002), Solbes (2004). What more important, 
the sustainability of the criteria fulfilment will be considered as the paramount prin-
ciple. The notion of sustainability can be interpreted as a long-term ability to abide 
by the Maastricht provisions. Some results of empirical research will be presented 
in the following sections. Inevitably however any EMU enlargement process in the 
future will be politically driven and to some extent arbitrary.
If Poland had joined ERM II soon after the EU accession on  1 May 2004, the 
earliest assessment date of the criteria fulfilment would be 2006. In the case of the 
positive evaluation Poland could theoretically join the EMU at the earliest one year 
after the examination date, that is in 2007. As we know it did not materialize and 
the first New Member State (NMS) that was able to join the EMU was Slovenia. 
Table 2. Intended EMU Membership Dates and Changeover Scenarios 
Country National target date for the adoption of the euro
ERM-2 membership/ 
Entry date
Type of scenario for 
the changeover/ dual 
circulation period 
Cyprus 1 January 2008 2 May 2005 Big-Bang/ one month




Estonia 1 January 2008 28 June 2004 Big-Bang/two weeks
Hungary 1 January 2010 No Big-Bang with possible 
phasing out/ one month 
Latvia 1 January 2008b 2 May 2005 Big-Bang/ one month
Lithuania 1 January 2007c 28 June 2004 Big-Bang/ 15 days
Malta 1 January 2008 2 May 2005 Big-Bang with phasing 
out/ one month
Poland No official target date No No
Slovak Republic 1 January 2009 28 November 2005 Big-Bang/ 16 days
Slovenia 1 January 2007 28 June 2004 Big-Bang/ 14 days
a Preliminary date. 
b To be postponed. 
c  No longer relevant after the negative assessment of the Convergence Reports of the European 
Commission and European Central Bank, 16 May 2006. 
S o u r c e :  European Commission (2006).
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Furthermore Poland became the only NMS that does not have an official strategy 
of joining the euro area (see Table 2).   
As we can see in Table 2 Slovenia and Lithuania wished to join the EMU in 2007 
and  Estonia, Malta Cyprus and Latvia in 2008. Bigger economies of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia declared later dates. In the next section the ratio-
nale behind the early strategy will be presented. 
4. Rationale behind early entry strategy
Potential costs and benefits of joining a common currency area have been well iden-
tified see e.g. De Grauwe (2000), Zank (2002) and Wojcik (2005). According to the 
monetary view Poland loses little from relinquishing its monetary independence 
by entering into the EMU. Above all the loss should be associated with giving up 
the domestic interest rate policy. According to the monetarist stance a flexible ex-
change rate does not serve as an efficient and permanent buffer against shocks and 
relinquishing this policy instrument does not incur additional costs, Stiglitz (1999), 
Buiter (1999), see more in section 7.  Indeed, in a world of free capital flows do-
mestic interest rate levels cannot depart permanently and considerably from global 
interest rate levels without increased volatility of the exchange rate, Archer (2002). 
In addition, upon entering into the European Union in May 2004 any EU member 
has to treat its monetary policy as a matter of common concern. Combined with 
the full liberalisation of capital flows this policy prescription restrains the monetary 
independence. Thus, although potentially Poland can use the monetary policy at 
discretion before entering into ERM II, in practice its independence has been  sur-
rendered earlier. At the same time, the loss of monetary policy and especially of the 
interest rate tool should not be very hard to swallow. Klos and Wrobel (2001) find 
no statistically significant reaction of output to monetary contraction in Poland. To 
be fair however, this result should be regarded with caution since, as the authors 
rightly point, there are major problems with calibration of econometric models in 
changing institutional framework. Besides, facts seem to contradict this finding. The 
restrictive interest rate policy is credited with containing inflation in Poland from 
2000 onwards. This is further discussed in section 6.
Notwithstanding, there are other powerful, mainly microeconomic arguments 
in favour of the early entry strategy. The entry at the earliest possible date implies 
that common currency gains such as elimination of exchange rate risks, reduction 
of country risks and transaction costs can be reaped earlier and thus support im-
mediately the growth rate. In the National Bank of Poland  report on the EMU en-
try strategy the Polish GDP growth in different EMU accession scenarios has been 
modelled, Borowski et al. (2004, pp. 60-88). The model used is based on a comput-
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able general equilibrium framework calibrated for Poland using the data from year 
2000. The applied model strongly simplifies reality since it only incorporates a well 
quantifiable effect of interest rate decrease due to a lower country risk. In the model 
the interest rate decrease translates into increase of aggregate demand and supply 
through the investment channel only. The simulations were performed for 3 sce-
narios. In the base case scenario the entry into the EMU is postponed considerably 
and the entry date is outside the simulation period. Two other scenarios assume an 
early entry, one at the earliest possible date identified in the previous section i.e. in 
2007 (A2007), the other three years later i.e. in 2010 (A2010). The simulation peri-
od is relatively long and spans from 2004 up to 2030. The results of the simulation 
with respect to the GDP growth are presented in Figure 1.
The simulations predict (Figure 1) in the A2007 and A2010 scenarios a sound 
growth rate exceeding 4% per year, which is driven by the benefits from the European 
Union accession. Simultaneously both EMU accession scenarios yield a higher 
growth rate in the projection period than the opt-out (base case) scenario. The ear-
liest possible entry into the monetary union (2007) was seen as preferable to the 
later entry in 2010 although the difference in growth rates is not big (Figure 1). By 
contrast, a small difference in annual growth rates between the opt-out scenario and 
the early accession scenarios accumulates over time to a substantial divergence. 
It has to be stressed once more that the simulation captures merely the effect of 
lower interest rates on the GDP growth. This reduction was particularly high in the 
fringe countries that imported credibility entering the EMU (see Table 3). Since 
Poland has been having relatively high market interest rates the impact of the re-
duced rates could be as strong as in the case of Spain or Ireland (Table 3). Thus the 
main effect was rightly predicted in the NBP report via the investment and foreign 
trade, mainly imports channels, Borowski et al. (2004). In reality a decrease of in-
terest rates is likely to trigger other positive effects that should amplify growth rate 
differentials in alternative scenarios. For instance these could be higher FDI and, 
Figure 1. GDP growth rate in Poland from 2004 to 2030 for different accession dates
Source: Borowski et al. (2004, p. 62)
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what has been particularly important in the case of Poland, lower cost of the public 
debt service facilitating Poland’s structural funds absorption capacity. 
Moreover, if the accession is delayed and other new members join  the euro zone 
early the FDI inflow can be decisively restrained. Under these circumstances the 
Polish country risk would be naturally higher than elsewhere, reflecting the uncer-
tainty about the future level of exchange rate. Without obstacles to a free movement 
of capital, people, goods and services potential investors are unlikely to run addi-
tional and unnecessary risks. In consequence, a sizable part of potential FDI would 
be allocated outside Poland.
The early entry strategy provides a strong impulse to complete necessary struc-
tural reforms, Balcerowicz (2002). A clearly communicated accession schedule would 
facilitate justifying unpopular reforms to the public and thus make them easier to 
swallow to the political parities. This may play a crucial role in Poland since both 
the fiscal framework reform and the labour market reform are politically and so-
cially difficult. In addition, it can be demonstrated that a rapid and credible reform 
produces a better outcome both in terms of likely short-term negative economic 
effects and positive expectations effects than a reform plan that stretches over time, 
Balcerowicz (2002). Successful fiscal reforms in Belgium and Ireland in the early 
1990s are cases in point here, Borowski et al. (2004). Besides, accession costs re-
lated to relinquishing monetary policy independence are only little reduced in the 
passage of time. The comparison of the monetary and fiscal frameworks of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, Slovenia and Poland 5 years prior to Poland’s potential mon-
etary union accession date shows (Table 4) that meeting the Maastricht provisions 
in time to qualify for an early accession date could be possible. According to all 3 
criteria Poland performed stronger than any of the EMU benchmark countries. 
Table 3. Real Interest Rates, Pre- and Post-EMU
Country 1993-1998 1999-2004 DIFF
Austria 2.5 1.2 –1.2
Belgium 3.1 1.2 –1.9
France 3.9 1.4 –2.4
Germany 2.5 1.7 –0.8
Italy 4.9 0.8 –4.1
Luxembourg 3.1 0.9 –2.2
Netherlands 2.1 1.7 –1.4
Finland 3.7 1.6 –2.1
Greece 7.4 1.0 –6.4
Ireland 4.5 –0.6 –5.1
Portugal 4.7 0.2 –4.5
Spain 4.3 0.0 –4.3
S o u r c e :  Lane (2006).
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Especially the inflation rate had been safely contained, which is often regarded as 
the most difficult task (Table 4). Slovenia did very well in terms of  budget deficit 
and public debt but had a high inflation rate (Table 4). This country however man-
aged to trim inflation and was ready to join the euro zone on 1 January 2007. The 
strategy of  the inflation containment in Poland will be discussed in section 6.
We argue that the best convergence mechanism available is joining of the mon-
etary union. A credible commitment to a common currency regime has a self-ful-
filling character, provided monetary union members are not excessively idiosyn-
cratic, Corsetti and Penseti (2002). There should be no fear of negative impact on 
the euro itself since all the new entrants account together for roughly 7% of GDP 
in the enlarged EU. Provided Poland is already sufficiently similar to the existing 
EMU members, the early entry  could be beneficial to all the parties, Hughes and 
Piscitelli (2001). In the following sections issues related to long-term nominal con-
vergence between Poland and the EMU countries will be discussed.
5. Convergence degree of Maastricht monetary criteria
As can be seen from Figure 2, the inflation rate in Poland, contained temporarily 
in 1999, rebounded above the 10% level in 2000. Starting in 2000 the inflation rate 
had been declining steadily and reached the lowest level in the second half of 2003 
(Figure 2). It rebound again to over 4% as a result of a strong domestic and foreign 
demand due to the EU membership (1 May 2004). The NBP reacted immediately 
and inflation rate declined again well below the Maastricht criterion (Figure 2). To 
a certain degree Slovenia followed the same pattern as Poland did in 1999-2000. 
Interestingly however later on the Slovenian disinflation was steady but less pro-
nounced; the inflation rate has been compatible with the Maastricht criterion level 
since the end of 2005 and continued to be very close to the benchmark (Figure 2). 
Table 4. Inflation, budget deficit and public debt in 5 years prior to the EMU entry date*
Country Inflation Budget deficit/GDP Public debt/GDP
Spain (1994) 4.7 6.1 62.6
Portugal (1994) 5.2 5.9 63.8
Greece (1996) 8.2 7.5 111.6
Poland (2002) 1.9 3,2 38.1
Slovenia (2002) 7.5 2.5 27.4
*  Slovenia declared its intention to join the EMU on 1 January 2007 (see table 1). This country 
was finally accepted as the EMU member on 1 January 2008.
S o u r c e :  European Commission and EUROSTAT.  
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The most important issue within the currency union is the long term ability to 
maintain the inflation rate at the low level, and to, at least, maintain competitive-
ness. This will be discussed in section 6.
In Figure 3 we present a 12-month moving average yield of Polish and Slovenian 
government bonds at the background of the convergence criterion. Due to the size 
and supply, Poland’s market for these bonds is much more liquid than the Slovenian 
one. Over the last years the long-term market interest rates have converged consid-
erably towards European levels. Poland met the interest rate criterion earlier than 
Slovenia. Later on, due to the surge in inflation and counteraction of the NBP, the 
yield on long-term bonds was again above the Maastricht level (Figure 3). It has 
Figure 2. Inflation in Poland and Slovenia (HICP 12-month moving average)  
vs. the convergence criterion in 1999–2007
Source: Eurostat, own calculation
Figure 3. Yield on long-term Polish and Slovenian government bonds  
vs. the convergence criterion in 1999–2007
Source: Eurostat, own calculation
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become compatible again with the EMU criterion since the beginning of 2005. It 
has to be seen that fluctuations of the Polish bond yield were higher that the ones 
of Slovenia’s. 
Polish zloty floats freely since 1999/2000 (Table 5). Slovenia being a small rel-
atively well developed economy used to have  stable macroeconomic conditions 
both at the beginning and in the course of transformation. It was also reflected in 
its exchange rate regime and led this country to the EMU membership on 1 January 
2007 (Table 5). Currently Poland does not meet the Maastricht exchange rate crite-
rion and will have to go through the two year period of ERM II in order to qualify 
for the EMU.
6. Is nominal convergence a steady-state?
Poland has made good progress towards meeting the Maastricht monetary conver-
gence criteria. Above all the inflation rate has been brought to historically low lev-
els. This is an important achievement, bearing in mind the inflation performance of 
the Polish economy during the 1990s. As a matter of fact Poland struggled to con-
tain inflation after a period of hyperinflation at the beginning of the transformation 
period. It took almost 10 years to bring progressively the inflation rate from about 
600% in 1989/1990 to 10.3% in 2000. Arguably, the disinflation path was carefully 
calibrated in order not to affect negatively the GDP growth by too tight monetary 
policy, Focus on Transition (2001). Golinelli and Rovelli (2002) performed simu-
lations of the inflation response to more aggressive policy stance. For Poland they 
found that, even in a more aggressive scenario, the path of nominal interest rates 
would have been almost unchanged. Simultaneously costs to the output would be 
greater implying lower GDP growth rates. From 1998 the inflation rate was almost 
Table 5. Exchange rate regimes in Poland and Slovenia in 1990–2007
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Poland 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 5-6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5-6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 €
1  Peg to a currency or a basket with fluctuation margins less than or equal to +/– 2.25%
2  Crawling peg with fluctuation margins of less than or equal to +/– 2.25%
3  Float with active management by monetary authorities (implicit crawling peg)
4  Crawling peg with fluctuation margins of more than +/–2.25
5  Peg to a currency or a basket with fluctuation margins of more than +/– 2.25%
6  Float with interventions
7  Free float
S o u r c e :  Egert (2006, p. 4) and own assessment of the NBP exchange rate polices.
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identical in either policy scenario. The findings of Golinelli and Rovelli (2002) 
confirm that no major mistakes were made in the conduct of monetary policy in 
Poland in the 1990s.
6.1. Review of empirical analysis of Maastricht criteria
The best and the most robust method of testing the long-term co-movement of 
economic variables is cointegration, Engle and Granger (1987). This technique was 
subsequently and extensively applied to investigate the scope of the Maastricht crite-
ria convergence between the first 12 EMU members. The research results provided 
mixed evidence. For example, in an early and influential study Haug, MacKinnon 
and Michelis (2000) find only a partial long–term co-movement of the existing 
EMU countries. Their findings are much in line with the current evidence where 
Italy, Portugal and Spain were identified as countries that might encounter problems 
within the EMU in the long-run. Meister (2002) tested the cointegration between the 
new EU and the current EMU members’. Meister concentrated on economic vari-
ables underlying the Maastricht criteria. For the period from 1995 until 2001 Meister 
found a strong convergence of Poland and the EMU countries with respect to both 
the interest rate and inflation. Meister notes, however, that throughout the examina-
tion period Polish interest rates remained above European interest rates. According 
to this study Poland is deemed ready, also in terms of the exchange rate stability, to 
enter ERM II and start fulfilling the Maastricht exchange rate criterion. 
Notwithstanding, there are three points that should be made in relation to the 
cointegration techniques. Firstly, as pointed out earlier in the chapter, the cointe-
gration of economic variables underlying the Maastricht monetary criteria is not 
a sufficient condition for joining the EMU. Secondly, cointegration tests require 
long-term time series and the convergence of the Maastricht reference values start-
ed only recently, Meister (2002). Thirdly, and what is most important, the cointe-
gration of monetary variables (nominal convergence), such as price index or inter-
est rate, does not tell the entire story, comp. Haug et al. (2000). In order to benefit 
in the long-run there should be a convergence of real sector variables, such as the 
productivity of labour or fluctuation of the GDP (real convergence). Some evidence 
for business cycle convergence between Poland and the EMU will be presented in 
the forthcoming article. 
6.2. Role of independent central bank 
Poland has gone a long way from the early days of transition before achieving do-
mestic price stability. Although the disinflation process took relatively long, the 
belief in a value of a stable currency was shared by the majority of Polish political 
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class from the very beginning of the transition process.  Simultaneously, there was 
recognition that sound institutions are a prerequisite for stabilisation and sustain-
able growth, Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000). With respect to the monetary policy 
framework this belief was confirmed by establishing of a two-tier banking system 
with the independent central bank Kowalski (2000) and Hochreiter and Kowalski 
(2000). In 1997 a new National Bank Act, strengthening the independence of mon-
etary policy institutional framework, was adopted. The institutional set-up guaran-
tees political and functional (free choice of monetary policy instruments, techniques 
and operational targets) independence of the National Bank of Poland. According 
to Article 3 (1) of the Act, the basic objective of the NBP is to maintain price stabil-
ity. At the same time the bank shall act in support of Government economic poli-
cies, insofar as it does not constrain pursuit of the basic objective of the NBP, Act 
on the NBP (1997). The central role in the monetary framework in Poland is con-
ferred on the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) which is solely responsible for the 
draft of policy guidelines and the conduct of monetary policy. In addition, the fi-
nancing of the government deficit is prohibited in the Constitution, which further 
strengthens the independence of the institutional framework. Insofar the Maastricht 
provisions (in particular Articles 108 and 109 of the Treaty and the Statutes of the 
ESCB) guaranteeing the independence of central bank are met. In 2004 Poland along 
with other candidate countries introduced a number of (mostly technical) amend-
ments to the NBP Act bringing closer to the acqui communataire implementation 
in the central banking sphere, ECB (2004, pp. 230-232). However, there is still a 
number of amendments that need to be implemented. Their scope is similar to that 
required from Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Lithuania, ECB (2006, pp. 60-77) and 
ECB (2007, pp. 73-81). 
The general institutional framework with the politically and functionally indepen-
dent central bank was put in place early and would be put in place even without the 
perspective of an early EMU entry. The institutional position of the NBP has brought 
in some monetary and fiscal policy coordination problems, Marszalek (2003) lead-
ing to hot debates between the NBP and consecutive governments. The new mone-
tary policy institutional framework introduced in 1997 strengthened the disinflation 
process, although as argued in the next section, economic context and a restrictive 
policy-mix played role as well. The anti-inflationary stance of the MPC has consid-
erably increased the credibility of the NBP as inflation fighter. In fact this position 
was still maintained even after nominating in 2007 a new governor, who was openly 
a political nominee from outside the academia and central bank’s circles.  
6.3. Emergence of a suboptimal policy-mix
Arguably, a strong reduction of inflation in Poland from 2000 onwards has been the 
by-product of monetary authorities’ response to a credibility problem at the fiscal 
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side of the economy. The fiscal stance has been reasonably conservative since 1990 
and was expected to remain so in the future, Green, Holmes and Kowalski (2001). 
At the beginning of 1999 the Monetary Policy Council continued to conduct loose 
monetary policy in order to revive the economy negatively impacted by the default 
of Russia in 1997. The easy monetary policy stance coincided with financial prob-
lems at the Social Security Fund. The fund had to be recapitalised by the govern-
ment in 1999 which brought about the increase in budget deficit by 2 percentage 
points of the GDP, Convergence Programme (2006, p. 24). As a result of both loose 
monetary and fiscal policy the inflation rate surged to more than 10% as can be 
seen from Figure 3. What is more important, the adverse developments on the fis-
cal side came much to a surprise because they were failed to be communicated by 
politicians, Rozkrut (2003). It has dealt an important blow to the credibility of fis-
cal authorities in the eyes of the NBP. In order to fulfil its inflation target and rein-
state the equilibrium in the current account the Monetary Policy Council tightened 
monetary stance; its outcome was also reflected by an increase in nominal market 
interest rates on Figure 3. As a result, real interest rates surged and in 2000-03 a mix 
of a too tight monetary and too loose fiscal policy was in place. This coincided with 
a period of global slowdown and brought inflation down to almost 0% in July 2003. 
In fact this tendency continued in 2004-2007. In terms of the EU Broad Economic 
Guidelines it was even aggravated by the 2005 Eurostat decision to treat (along the 
ESA ’95 accounting scheme) annual costs of the establishment of capital-based pen-
sion system (Open Pension Funds) as being outside the public finance framework. 
This has had a significant impact on both the deficit and public debt level and meant 
that Poland has become the Excess Deficit Procedure (EDP) economy.      
By contrast, joining the EMU will bring about lower, European level interest rates 
(comp. Table 3). It is uncertain whether the reduction of real interest rates is not 
going to produce a counter-reaction on the real side of the economy. The economic 
situation in Poland has been steadily improving, driven by a strong export perfor-
mance of Polish companies and  surge in all components of domestic demand. This 
has brought some fears of inflation and made the NBP  begin a series of interest rate 
increases. The EU membership in the case of Poland meant a clear textbook-style 
trade creation phenomenon. Poland not only has a higher share of exports to GDP 
than Spain but also enjoys trade surplus with the EU countries. 
6.4. Nominal convergence as a statistical illusion?
As mentioned in section 6.1 the studies of convergence between Poland and the 
EMU countries have to rely on a relatively short time series. In consequence, their 
methodological robustness might be put in question. As pointed out by Klos and 
Wrobel (2001) there is a major difficulty in applying econometric methods to tur-
bulent institutional environment that characterises a transition economy. For ex-
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ample in Poland between 1990 and 2007 there were five major changes of exchange 
rate regime (comp. Table 5). The exchange rate policy evolved progressively from a 
dollar-based peg towards a full float, Kowalski and Stawarska (1999). What is more 
important, there were major changes in central banks’ operational targets. NBP 
used credit limits at the beginning of the period, officially targeted money supply 
from 1994 to 1997 and resorted to exchange rate interventions. In 1999 NBP start-
ed to pursue direct inflation targeting (DIT), using interest rate and open market 
operations as the main tools. All these developments should be regarded as nec-
essary changes in a successful transforming economy. Simultaneously, they pres-
ent an obstacle to building structural models of economic variables underlying the 
Maastricht criteria. 
The danger of a surge in inflation rate after entering the EMU exists for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, there may be a more pronounced operation of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, which will be considered in section 8. Secondly the introduc-
tion of the euro will increase international price transparency and facilitate inter-
national comparisons, thus leading to stiffer competition in the domestic market. 
This should be beneficial to consumers. However, may not be so if there are strong 
income differences between countries. The price structure in Poland, with prices of 
nontradables lagging considerably behind, does not fully reflect the price structure 
in Western Europe, comp. e.g. Egert (2007). In the long run the Polish price struc-
ture will rejoin the European pattern as a result the equilibrium mechanism. To as-
sure a smooth accommodation and no abrupt price increases shortly after the EMU 
entry, there is a need for labour market flexibility and/or mobility. Indeed, Polish 
and the other New Members States labor is internationally mobile and much more 
flexible than that from core European countries. However, as De Grauwe (2007) 
rightly points out the very mobility and market flexibility of labor are only neces-
sary but not sufficient conditions for successful and sustainable EMU membership. 
Insofar, the observed inflation level in Poland may be low but does not have to re-
main so in the future. Indeed there are some signs of a growing inflation pressure 
(see Figure 2).
7. Foreign exchange regime and a role of market expectations 
Adhering to the irrevocable exchange rate regime is regarded as one of the most 
prominent Maastricht criteria and the pillar of the Optimum Currency Area theory. 
In principle the flexible exchange rate is commonly considered as a very important 
accommodation mechanism and the costs of giving up exchange rate independence 
are in the centre of the current domestic monetary union debate, Ho and McCauley 
(2003). We argue that the belief in accommodative capacities of flexible exchange 
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rates and monetary policy in general is a relic of the ‘fine tuning fallacy’. The belief in 
ability to precisely steer a small open economy in the world of free capital flows has 
proved unrealistic and as such do not belong any more to mainstream economics. 
Still the old ideas often appeal to general public and as such are exploited by poli-
ticians. Unfortunately the exchange rate policy belongs to one of the most abused 
areas. Examples of exchange rate policies in the form of rare successful devaluations 
are often generalized to defend the case of maintaining national currencies. National 
currencies are believed too important to disappear, Kenen (2000).  
There is no single theory that can precisely explain the evolution of exchange 
rates and the unpredictable behaviour of exchange rate markets, in particular in the 
short run, belongs to stylized economic facts. One of the objectives of a 2-year stay 
in a relatively flexible ERM II is testing the exchange rate equilibrium level. In other 
words, during this period a fair value of the currency should be attained. 
In the following section we will discuss some theories that attempt to shed light 
on the evolution of exchange rates and determine the equilibrium exchange rate 
level. The oldest and probably the most important is the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP). The PPP theory assumes the equality of tradables prices across countries and 
explains the movement of exchange rates by differences in expected relative infla-
tion rates. The Purchasing Power Parity roughly holds in the long run. However 
currencies often spend long periods outside the fair value determined by the PPP. 
There exist a number of approaches and models to deal with these deficiencies of 
the PPP, Egert (2004), Rogoff (1996). 
If the fiscal stance of a country is somewhat problematic the currency typically 
slides in anticipation of depreciation/devaluation. The depreciation/devaluation ex-
pectations are often fuelled by speculation. However, they may also be fuelled by the 
Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) theory, Williamson (1994), Egert 
(2003), Marrewijk (2004). According to this theory, the equilibrium exchange rate is 
compatible with internal equilibrium defined as equilibrium between potential and 
actual output and external equilibrium defined as the level of current account deficit 
that can be sustainable financed by the inflow of medium or long-term investments, 
Borowski et al (2004), Marrewijk (2004). If economic fundamentals underlying in-
ternal or external equilibrium are expected to change, the economic consequences 
are being incorporated in exchange rate levels. Arguably, the recent developments 
of the Polish zloty/euro exchange rate are well explained by the FEER theory. The 
evolution of the nominal exchange rate is given in Figure 4.
From June 2000 till July 2001 the zloty experienced a strong appreciation that 
can be explained by the Interest Rate Parity theory. At that time real interest rates 
were very high as the central bank attempted to counter-balance loose fiscal policy. 
The depreciation of the zloty from June 2001 until February 2004 is to some extent 
explained by nominal interest rate cuts in line with decreasing inflation. Arguably 
however, the most important factor behind the depreciation is the impact of wors-
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ening fiscal position on the market expectations. In particular the high volatility 
periods and subsequent sharp slumps resulted in the aftermath of budget revisions 
or official releases of disappointing deficit figures. The PPP theory cannot explain 
the evolution of the EUR/PLN exchange rate from 2002 till the end of 2003. There 
has been no inflation differential between Poland and the EMU (Polish inflation 
rate in 2003 being below the European level that would justify appreciation and 
not depreciation). Simultaneously, there has been no reason to fear inflation in-
crease in Poland, at least prior to the entry into the EMU, given the institutional 
framework in place. The nominal appreciation of PLN from the beginning of 2004 
onwards should be linked to a number of factors. These are the anticipation of the 
EU membership, increasing inflow of FDI and structural funds, remittances from 
Polish workers employed in the UE countries and a specific combination of mon-
etary policy and productivity differences (see section 8). 
According to the Maastricht exchange rate provision, the exchange rate should 
not experience severe tensions during 2 years prior to the examination date. The is-
sue of severe tensions was addressed in the past by examining the degree of devia-
tions from the central rate, by using various indicators and by considering the role 
played by exchange rate interventions, Borowski et al (2004, pp. 114-115). The ECB 
uses a daily Exchange Rate Volatility (ERV) indicator. Such volatility of EUR/PLN 
exchange rate during the whole period since 2000 was relatively high, Borowski et 
al (2004) and Jurek 2006). It was not only higher than in the NMS but also high-
er than in the case of Spain, Ireland and Greece prior to their EMU membership. 
This finding should not be surprising given the fact that the zloty has been float-
ing freely since 1999 (see Table 5) and the Polish interbank currency market is the 
biggest in the NMS. In addition, on  1 October 2002 a new Foreign Exchange Act, 
lifting almost all restrictions on capital transactions with OECD countries, was in-
Figure 4. Exchange rate PLN/€ (January 2000 – July 2007)
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troduced. Further liberalisation was implemented prior to May 2004 in order to 
fulfil the requirements stipulated in Art. 56 of the TEC that reads: ”... all restrictions 
on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and 
third countries shall be prohibited”. 
The volatility of the Greek drachma decreased considerably after its entry into 
the ERM II. Greek authorities stabilized the exchange rate both by interventions 
and high interest rate policy, Coricelli (2002), Hochreiter and Tavlas (2004). Greek 
experience sheds some light on challenges related to stay in ERM II, since unlike 
other EMU countries Greece did not take part in the first wave of the Accession. In 
fact the central parity set at the outset of ERM II membership is likely to become 
a ceiling for the future exchange rate, implying that countries will tend to be on 
the appreciation part of the band, Hochreiter and Tavlas (2004). Any movement 
above the parity (depreciation) would fuel expectations of inability to enter the euro 
zone. Since the currency cannot be devalued, the central bank will have to inter-
vene in order to support the exchange rate. Under ERM II central banks of the ac-
cession countries need to amass large amounts of foreign reserves to deter specu-
lators since, judging by the Greek experience, the ECB supports interventions only 
if the exchange rate approaches the +/– 15% band. The central bank should keep 
the exchange rate in the lower section of the band through high interest rate policy 
as well, Hochreiter and Tavlas (2004). Both strategies were successfully applied by 
the Greek central bank. 
From the candidate country perspective the current period of the strong euro is 
a good moment to start negotiations on the central rate upon the EMU accession. 
By agreeing on the central rate close to the current market rate, the new EU coun-
tries can thus alleviate the consequences of currency appreciation policies than will 
have to be pursued in ERM II. 
As already discussed, pegging the exchange rate implies giving up actual mon-
etary policy independence. The experience of Denmark, that has agreed with the 
ECB on the +/– 2.25% fluctuation band, shows the practice of monetary policy con-
duct in ERM II. Danish Central Bank’s interest rates must be adjusted in step with 
the ECB interest rates in order to achieve exchange rate stability, Jensen (2001) and 
Bernstein (2006). 
Arguably however, the biggest obstacle in meeting the exchange rate criterion lies 
elsewhere. The principle of equal treatment shall be applied to ‘the EMU suitability’ 
assessment. As pointed out by Kenen and Meade, (2003), due to a completely differ-
ent economic and institutional context brought about by the creation of the EMU 
nowadays, the application of the principle of equal treatment does not translate into 
equivalent treatment of new EU countries. The reason, with respect to the exchange 
rate policy, is as follows, Kenen and Meade, (2003, pp. 4-9): it might be difficult to 
fulfil simultaneously the price stability criterion and the exchange rate criterion due 
to the B-S effect. To make matters worse, the central characteristics of ERM II is a 
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fixed rate arrangement without the protection of capital controls. To be conform-
ing to the Treaty the new EU countries had to dismantle all the remaining capital 
controls on 1 May 2004. A history of exchange rate crises in the 1990s suggests that 
pegged exchange rate arrangements without capital controls are very dangerous 
and risky in a world of high capital mobility, Begg et al (2003). Simultaneously, an 
environment of open capital markets, limited exchange rate flexibility and ongoing 
structural reform is attracting capital inflows. 
A large, new EU country with a sizeable financial market is a likely target of short 
term financial flows. Poland has already experienced large FDI inflows and also, 
after 2004 in particular, a sizable amount of portfolio investments that were much 
more volatile (Figure 5). Portfolio capital flows are bound to increase under ERM 
II, Kenen and Meade, (2003) On the one hand there will be capital inflows as there 
is a consensus that the new member countries are going to grow quicker than the 
existing EMU members, Begg et al. (2003). By joining the EU these countries com-
mit to abide by legal and institutional framework that guarantees a free movement 
of goods, services people and capital. As a result, the investment opportunities in 
the new EU countries will have interesting return/risk characteristics. In addition, 
there will be a sizable capital inflows from European structural funds. On the other 
hand, there will be capital outflows as residents of the new member countries search 
for investment opportunities abroad, Begg et al. (2003). The fact that after the EU 
entry, the existing EU countries will care more about the consequences of capital 
inflows and should be willing to support the new members in their efforts to prevent 
Figure 5. FDI and portfolio investment in Poland in 2000-2007 (million of euro)
FDI  mean = 648 min = – 65 max = 4063   Std.Dev. = 569
Portfolio  mean = 387 min = – 1134  max = 3220  Std.Dev. = 878
Total invest. Mean = 1035 min =  – 664 max = 3807 Std.Dev. = 1005
Source:  NBP, own calculation
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and resolve crises is of little consolation. According to the articles 119 and 120 of the 
TEC, the permission to reintroduce capital controls may be granted as an emergency 
measure to a member of the EMU with a derogation experiencing serious balance 
of payments problems. Following the article 120 (1) such measures must cause the 
least possible disturbance in the functioning of the common market and should be 
carefully tailored to remedy the difficulties which have arisen. Notwithstanding, it 
would require a political masterpiece to convince the Commission of the necessity 
to reintroduce capital controls. In addition, central banks prefer to use preventively 
the interest rate tool instead, anxious not to damage their credibility and to avoid 
unexpected policy moves. 
If the Commission should maintain its assessment policy as declared the only 
realistic policy option that enables for the zloty to stay within the narrow band is 
the conclusion of a special agreement with the ECB. This agreement should guaran-
tee a joint intervention from the ECB and the NBP at the margins of the exchange 
rate bands. In particular, there are two types of financing facilities available. On the 
one hand, the very short term financing comes into operation when the exchange 
rate approaches the margin of the fluctuation band. The intervention is automatic 
and unlimited if supported by fiscal and monetary stabilisation measures in the af-
fected country. On the other hand, intra-marginal interventions can also be imple-
mented unilaterally by the national central bank concerned, in coordination with 
the ECB, Rzeszutek (2000). The ECB can suspend the intervention in the unlikely 
case of danger to the price stability in the EMU. According to the readings of the 
ECB policy position special ‘narrow band’ arrangements can be agreed on case-by-
case basis but they are deemed to be exceptional. 
8. Balassa-Samuelson effect – will it be a problem?
The difficulties concerning the membership in ERM II would be much less pro-
nounced, had the new EU countries been allowed to inflate more than the existing 
EMU countries. Essentially the B-S effect which is often responsible for stimulating 
the price level operates either through nominal exchange rate appreciation or an in-
crease in the inflation rate. To see this we may apply a standard approach used by De 
Grauwe and Schnable (2005, pp. 538-541). The production conditions for tradables 
(T) and nontradables (NT) are expressed by two Cobb-Douglas functions: 
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In the case of NMS we may assume that EMU tradable prices (PTE) are for them 
exogenous and for simplicity constant and that PPP holds for tradables. Thus these 
goods prices (PTA) for the NMS can be expressed in the following way: PTA=EA/E * PTE, 
where EA/E  is the exchange rate against the euro of a NMS. Substituting PT in (3) by 
the RHS of the above formula we get an expression showing the B-S potential im-













Using formula 4 and following De Grauwe and Schnable (2005, pp. 540-541) we 
might clearly distinguish two adjustment mechanisms within the B-S framework. 
The first is a situation of such NMS as Poland that is following the DIT strategy 
and keeps its inflation rate in line or below the EMU level. In this particular case 
the relative productivity gains, QT, within our assumptions will be reflected in the 
nominal appreciation of a domestic currency against the euro, EA/E. Indeed, this ad-
justment, from 2003/2004 onwards, can be seen on Figure 4. The second case rep-
resents the situation of such NMS as Estonia  that chose the currency board solu-
tion. In their case (see formula 4) the relative productivity gains, QT, lead to higher 
inflation in nontradables.  
Although the statistical difficulties in measurement of monetary policy efficiency 
discussed in section 6.4. do not fully apply here, there are significant difficulties in 
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measurement of the B-S effect as well. The extent of the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
in Poland has been a subject of numerous studies with the average estimated infla-
tion impact of about 1.0-1.5% for Poland, see for example Egert (2002) and (2007), 
Coricelli and Jazbec (2002), Mihaljek and Klau (2003) and Chmielewski (2003). 
Figure 6 gives the ratio between the producer price index (PPI) and the consumer 
price index (CPI) in the different accession countries, EEAG Report (2004). Since 
PPI includes a larger share of tradables than the CPI (services play a greater role 
here) the operation of the B-S effect would imply a fall of the PPI/CPI ratio over time 
since the PPI contains mostly tradables’ prices which cannot rise above the world 
level. Figure 6 illustrates the differences between countries. For Poland the 5% im-
pact of the B-S effect over 5 years confirms the estimates provided by the empirical 
research cited above. It is interesting to note that the pattern of PPI/CPI in Cyprus 
from 2001 onwards closely follows that of the Euro area and Slovenia.
The relatively low level of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Poland combined with 
strong commitment from the central bank to maintain the low inflation rate should 
enable  meeting of the Maastricht price stability criterion. However, in practice the 
conduct of monetary policy that is compatible with both the price and exchange 
rate stability is tricky. As pointed out by Rosati and also by Schardax, in a country 
experiencing the B-S effect the inflation rate can be decomposed in two elements: 
‘good’ inflation related to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and ‘bad’ inflation related 
to other effects, Rosati (1998) and Schardax (2001).
Figure 6. The Ratio of Tradables to Nontradables Prices (%)
Source: Based on EEAG Report (2004, p. 134)
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The ‘good’ inflation reflecting increased productivity should not be contained by 
monetary policy measures since it is the natural effect that accompanies the struc-
tural transformation of the economy i.e. the real convergence. The monetary policy 
aimed at reducing the ‘good’ inflation would slow down the catching up process. 
The precise assessment of the Balassa-Samuelson effect depends on the choice of 
price index and inflation target, see Mihaljek and Klau (2003). Given that scope of 
manoeuvre available to monetary authorities is limited by the Maastricht criteria, 
the task is difficult. If in the coming  years the B-S effect amplifies, the accession 
to the monetary union would be possible only for a price of the GDP growth rate 
reduction and further nominal appreciation. Having said that however we need to 
remember that Poland along with other NMS became open economies and that 
more and more services belong to tradables whose prices are determined on the 
European and global market. The appreciation (comp. formula 4) would lower do-
mestic inflationary pressure. In addition, as discussed in section 2.2., it is the only 
realistic strategy compatible with the requirements of ERM II in the case of infla-
tion differentials between the applicant country and the EMU. 
A potential side-effect of the short-term nominal contraction needed to coun-
ter-balance the B-S effect is a possible inflationary reaction after the entry into the 
EMU, Szapary (2001). Subdued by tight monetary policy during the nominal con-
vergence process, the economy may overreact when confronted with the lower inter-
est rates in the monetary union, see Table 3 and Figure 7. The resulting increase in 
Figure 7. Real, Intra Euro Area Real Trade-weighted Exchange Rates Based on CPI. 
1999 Q1=100
Source: Based on Bruegel Policy Report (2006, p. 2)
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inflation could quickly jeopardize the competitive position of the country. Arguably, 
this happened in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece (Figure 7). After the entry into 
the EMU a considerable increase in domestic demand was not accompanied by 
a comparable productivity growth. In consequence there was both a higher than 
elsewhere inflation rate and current account deficit, particularly acute in Spain (its 
current account deficit in 2006 was the biggest, after the US, in world), that trans-
lates inside a monetary union into an increase of total private and public debt. The 
situation of Ireland is different; despite its intra Euro area relative real appreciation 
(Figure 7) the Irish economy has been able to expand faster than the other EMU 
countries maintaining its competitive advantage.  In order to regain international 
competitiveness, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece must resort to a difficult process 
of real depreciation through a combination of fiscal tightening and wage restrains. 
Such a set of recommendations is politically difficult not only for the current EMU 
countries but also for the NMS. Provided the increase of income is continued, the 
B-S effect can be reconcilable with maintaining international competitiveness. With 
the progress of the catching-up process the operation of the Balassa-Samuelson ef-
fect will be less pronounced.  
9. Conclusion
We have investigated the degree of Poland’s convergence to the Maastricht criteria 
with respect to the monetary policy framework. What might be somewhat surprising, 
Poland does already meet the inflation rate criterion and the interest rate criterion. 
Arguably some doubts remain whether the nominal convergence is a steady state 
despite encouraging results of empirical research. The monetary policy framework 
that has been put in place rests on independent monetary authorities. The institu-
tional set-up, designed to exclude political interventions, has proved to be an effec-
tive price stabilisation mechanism. In consequence, despite some points of concern, 
meeting inflation and interest rate Maastricht criteria within the timeframe dictated 
by the early EMU entry do not pose problems in Poland. Obviously the participation 
in the ERM II does pose more problems and is closely linked to the fulfilment of 
the fiscal criteria. Since the ERM II phase has to last  two years it should be entered 
only when the fiscal criteria are met in a sustainable way. The fiscal criteria, at least 
in the case of Poland (and also of Hungary) seem to be politically difficult.
The fulfilment of the Maastricht monetary and fiscal criteria is likely to be 
only a necessary condition for joining the EMU. What is more important, politi-
cal considerations that can be interpreted as a belief in the sustainable conver-
gence between the existing EMU members and the ‘applicant’ country will play 
a decisive role. 
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